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Schlagwort: El Fasher

  • Sudan: From Janjaweed to RSF

    Sudan: From Janjaweed to RSF

    This article traces the Janjaweed’s origins, the pathway from Janjaweed to RSF, and the financing, recruitment, and foreign ties that sustain them. It looks beyond a purely human-rights frame to examine the material and ideological foundations of the project.


    Table of Contents

    1. Background
    2. Roots of the Janjaweed
    3. From Janjaweed to RSF
    4. Economics of a Militia
    5. Ideology of a Militia
    6. Agency and Violence

    Background

    Sudan’s current violence did not begin with the RSF’s 2025 takeover of El Fasher, nor with the 2023 power struggle between the RSF and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), the 2021 coup against the transitional government, or the 2019 ouster of Omar al-Bashir, or even the 2013 rebranding of the Janjaweed into the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Its roots reach back to the 2003 war in Darfur—and further, to the 1980s, with the formation of the Janjaweed militia.

    In 2003, Darfuri rebels rose up against the Sudanese government, due to systematic oppression of non-Arab communities. The Janjaweed militia became the backbone of the government’s counter-insurgency. Despite official denials, state resources flowed into Darfur, and the Janjaweed were equipped and coordinated as a paramilitary force, with communications gear and even artillery support (from the Sudanese Army).

    Between 2003 and 2008, Janjaweed militias carried out crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, widespread rape, and torture in Darfur, killing an estimated 300,000 civilians and displacing about 2.7 million. These atrocities formed the basis for the International Criminal Court’s indictments of Sudan’s then-president, Omar al-Bashir, on charges of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.

    The Janjaweed evolved into a formidable militia. Despite disarmament efforts, they were reorganized into the RSF, which grew strong enough to rival the national army. In 2023, this culminated in a power struggle between the RSF under Hemeti and the SAF under al-Burhan.

    On 28 October, El Fasher—the capital of North Darfur—fell to the RSF, with mass atrocities, destruction, and rape reported. Much coverage filters Sudan through a humanitarian lens that catalogs harm and lists actors but rarely probes motivations or the political economy behind them, dissolving agency into an ethical abstraction.

    This article takes a different approach. It examines the material foundations (land, resources, war finance), the ideological narratives (racial hierarchy, center–periphery identity, Islamist/Arabist frames), and human agency—why people joined, stayed, and acted as they did. It also challenges the reduction of Sudan’s crisis to “tribal warfare” or “Arab vs. African,” a framing that has justified excluding Darfur’s Arabs from engagement and has entrenched the very conditions that fuel militia violence.

    References

    1. Entrenching Impunity Government Responsibility for International Crimes in Darfur
    2. Empty Promises
    3. Tens of thousands fleeing on foot amid atrocities in Sudan’s El Fasher
    4. All Eyes on Sudan

    Roots of the Janjaweed

    KABKABIYA, SUDAN – NOVEMBER 21: FILE, Arab militias, a pro government paramilitary group, called „janjaweed“, are responsible for helping the government in the raid of African villages that has left 1.6 million Africans in the Darfur region of Sudan homeless and tens of thousands dead in Kabkabiya, Sudan on November 21, 2004. Refugees like these who have been driven from their lands by militias, could lose their land if a law that allows the government to take over land abandoned for one year. Thousands of Darfurians approach the first anniversary away from their villages many families in the refugee camps are still too scared to go home. (Photo by Jahi Chikwendiu/The Washington Post via Getty Images)

    The Sudanese state’s “militia strategy” dates back at least to the 1980s under Jaafar Nimeiri and persisted through later regimes. In Darfur, many recruits were drawn from criminal bands and marginalized groups within so-called “Arab” tribes, then organized and armed. These militias also tapped cross-border mercenary networks in Chad and Darfur—some shaped under Gaddafi’s patronage and infused with Arab-supremacist ideas.

    The Sudanese government funded and organized the Janjaweed in 2003 (and even before) to counter the Darfur rebellion after the regular army proved ineffective. The government did so despite clear evidence that these militias were committing severe human rights abuses, including forced displacement and widespread land clearance. Entire villages were burned on suspicion of rebel ties.

    The British colonial administration had recognized dars (homelands) for most farmer groups in Darfur but left some nomad Arabs reliant on customary use rights—later strained by drought, desertification, and rising inter-communal violence. Some leaders then sought formal land for their people; others accepted promises of money and power, disregarding consequences. Not all Arab constituencies joined the „Janjaweed“; many tried to remain neutral, and a number of leaders refused to participate.

    Over time, Janjaweed campaigns shifted land from largely settled farming communities labeled “African” to nomadic groups who, in a modern capitalist sense, were not traditional landholders. This dispossession created a lasting legitimacy problem: living on seized land demands continual force, outside patrons, and a steady flow of weapons to entrench and expand control. From afar, the conflict can appear as an “ethnic civil war,” yet victims included both groups marked as “Arab” and those marked as “African.”

    Violence hardened identities: the more coercion was used and justified, the more communal labels were fixed and politicized, turning fluid social boundaries into rigid fronts. In this spiral, violence did not merely follow identity—it helped make it, as coercion and dispossession produced racialized boundaries that were then invoked to justify further violence.

    Ethnicity has been manipulated by all sides, and lines have been sharpened by portraying the conflict as a genocidal war against “Africans.” Yet when government steps back and neighbors with long histories of coexistence meet to settle disputes, local politics and material interests outweigh imposed “racial” identities. Conflating „Janjaweed“ with „Arab“ helps perpetuate those narratives that seek to draw the conflict among tribal ethnic lines.

    References

    1. Beyond ‘Janjaweed’: Understanding the Militias of Darfur

    From Janjaweed to RSF

    Mohamed Hamdan Daglo (C), known as Hemeti, deputy head of Sudan’s ruling Transitional Military Council (TMC) and commander of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitaries, waves a baton to supporters on a vehicle as he arrives for a rally in the village of Abraq, about 60 kilometers northwest of Khartoum, on June 22, 2019. (Photo by Yasuyoshi CHIBA / AFP) (Photo by YASUYOSHI CHIBA/AFP via Getty Images)

    Mirroring the international conflation of “Arab” with “Janjaweed,” the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) signed in Abuja in 2006 left many nomadic “Arab” communities feeling betrayed. It sidelined their concerns and failed to address nomadic land ownership. With land at the core of the conflict, the agreement was seen as disadvantaging nomads and deepening distrust of the government.

    The DPA called for disarming the Janjaweed. Yet nomadic groups—the backbone of many militias—have long fought to protect migration routes and, when necessary, force access to pasture and water. Fearing reprisals and lacking credible guarantees of security or land, many concluded that retaining their weapons was essential. At the same time, the Janjaweed had fragmented into multiple, often indistinguishable groups with overlapping interests, leaving the government unable to stop or disarm them.

    Frustration among government-aligned militias simmered after 2006 and culminated in late 2007 with the mutiny of Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (“Hemeti”). Khartoum appeased him to prevent wider defections: Hemeti received a brigadier general’s rank and command, his men were issued military IDs and salaries, and a large cash infusion effectively turned his organization into a capitalist enterprise.

    With Hemeti back on side, President Omar al-Bashir moved to reorganize Darfur’s militias under tighter control. In 2013 the government created the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) from the Janjaweed militias and put Hemeti in charge. The RSF was later granted regular-force status (2015) and incorporated as an auxiliary within Sudan’s armed services (2017), positioned in part to protect Bashir against internal coups. While the Janjaweed were renamed as the RSF, their tactics did not change and were used to crush uprisings in Darfur.

    After mass protests in 2019, the army removed Bashir. Hemeti did not defend his former patron and acknowledged protesters’ demands as legitimate, but the RSF soon participated in violent repression, including the June 2019 Khartoum sit-in dispersal—echoing methods previously used in Darfur. An uneasy RSF–SAF power-sharing arrangement followed.

    That alliance collapsed on April 15, 2023. General al-Burhan cast the RSF as bandits; Hemeti presented himself as pro-democracy. Beyond personal rivalry, the war reflects longer dynamics: the marginalization of Darfur, competition over economic and natural resources, and the state’s long-term use and arming of militias to quash resistance in the peripheries.

    References

    1. Beyond ‘Janjaweed’: Understanding the Militias of Darfur
    2. Tribal Militias in Sudan
    3. Sudan’s outsider: how a paramilitary leader fell out with the army and plunged the country into war

    Economics of a Militia

    This picture shows the shop window of a jewelry store in Dubai on March 10, 2025. Sudan’s gold industry is booming thanks to Emirati financing, but instead of helping end the war, it is fuelling it by enriching both the army and paramilitaries, according to official and NGO data. Demand for the country’s massive gold reserves is „a key factor in prolonging the war,“ Sudanese economist Abdelazim al-Amawy told AFP. (Photo by Giuseppe CACACE / AFP) (Photo by GIUSEPPE CACACE/AFP via Getty Images)

    Initially intended as Bashir’s loyalists—as his legitimacy waned—the RSF was deployed nationwide under intelligence oversight to deter internal threats. In parallel, it assumed border-enforcement roles within Sudan–EU migration-control frameworks. That role was often opportunistic: units alternated between stopping migrants and trafficking or ransoming them—whichever paid more. Becoming Sudan’s border guard in chief proved an effective cover for smuggling.

    The RSF and Hemeti understood that money and resources were the keys to power and loyalty in Sudan’s peripheries. He and his family built a financial empire behind the RSF, leveraging official clout to capture natural resources and state contracts. A turning point came around 2017, when his forces took control of the Jebel Amer gold mines in North Darfur. With Bashir’s approval, Hemeti’s firm gained export rights; soon a large share of Sudan’s gold trade was in RSF hands. Profits funded RSF expansion, enriched the Hemeti clan, and provided financial incentives for further recruitment.

    The RSF also delivered geopolitical leverage. By deploying forces to Yemen in support of Saudi Arabia and the UAE—reports cited figures up to 40,000 by 2017—Hemeti secured external patrons. After Bashir’s ouster, Saudi Arabia and the UAE pledged $3 billion to back the army–RSF junta. The partnership extended to Libya, where in 2019 about 1,000 RSF fighters supported Khalifa Haftar’s offensive on Tripoli.

    As Hemeti’s prominence grew, so did his business interests, aided by Bashir’s patronage. The family expanded into gold mining, livestock, and infrastructure, creating a revenue base independent of the regular state budget and the Sudanese Armed Forces. This autonomy strengthened the RSF’s bargaining position in Khartoum and in regional dealings.

    The RSF also paid better than the army or other militias—a decisive factor amid economic decline after South Sudan’s secession, falling oil revenues, and gold’s rise as a pillar of the economy. For many young men in Darfur and beyond, RSF salaries, access to spoils, and protection networks outweighed scarce alternatives in a shrinking labor market. The scale of RSF-linked gold extraction even helped fuel a surge in gold flows to the UAE, underscoring the force’s economic reach.

    As the RSF–SAF war unfolded, external finance remained central. Hemeti had become the UAE’s preferred partner, which sought to expand its regional influence through a proposed $6 billion port-and-agriculture project on the Red Sea coast announced in 2022, with Emirati firms holding a majority profit stake. Such deals fit a broader Gulf strategy along the Red Sea and offered the RSF prospective funding streams outside formal state channels.

    As the war has progressed, the RSF has come to resemble the Bashir-era model: minimal pay for fighters and permission to pillage as de facto wages. This is not incidental. Revenue and coalition maintenance depend on the continuous appropriation of public and private resources. Such flows are largely immune to sanctions because they are sourced on the ground. Looting is also organized, not random.

    In Wad Medani, the December 2023 raid on the World Food Programme warehouse—stocked to feed 1.5 million people for a month—was not the work of “hungry residents,” as the RSF claimed, but was organized by RSF commanders to provision their troops. Other plunder is more localized but still regulated: new recruits are encouraged to raid homes and villages as a form of payment for their participation in fighting.

    RSF soldiers turned traders now sit at the intersection of predation and production. From influential positions, they broker the RSF’s new economic frontiers, taking lucrative cuts to keep goods moving. A reshaped social hierarchy gives the RSF an edge, enabling external alliances through labor and commerce—both as merchants selling to the public and as brokers moving goods to and within markets. Other occupations have been pulled into the same extraction-tied-to-production logic.

    Five job types structure the RSF’s labor hierarchy: soldiers, informants, drivers, thieves, and day laborers. Recruits from tribes close to Hemeti sit at the top, serving as field commanders and economic entrepreneurs who manage markets and oversee supply chains.

    References

    1. Beyond ‘Janjaweed’: Understanding the Militias of Darfur
    2. Sudan’s outsider: how a paramilitary leader fell out with the army and plunged the country into war
    3. Effects of EU policies in Sudan
    4. Money Is Power: Hemedti and the RSF’s Paramilitary Industrial Complex in Sudan
    5. The ugly side of the Africa-UAE (United Arab Emirates) gold trade: Gold export misreporting and smuggling
    6. All Eyes on Sudan

    Ideology of a Militia

    Members of Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitaries led by General Mohamed Hamdan Daglo, also known as Hemeti, deputy head of Sudan’s ruling Transitional Military Council (TMC) and commander of the RSF paramilitaries, stand guard during the General’s meeting with his supporters in the capital Khartoum on June 18, 2019. (Photo by Yasuyoshi CHIBA / AFP) (Photo by YASUYOSHI CHIBA/AFP via Getty Images)

    As the RSF–SAF war unfolded, external finance remained central. Hemeti had emerged as Abu Dhabi’s preferred partner as it sought to expand influence along the Red Sea’s key trade route, via a proposed $6 billion port-and-agriculture project with a majority Emirati profit stake. The deal fits a broader Gulf strategy on the Red Sea and promised off-budget revenue streams for the RSF beyond formal state channels.

    Since independence, Sudan’s ruling elites drew on hierarchies that cast “Arab” as civilization and “African” as other. This framing helped justify unequal wealth distribution toward “Arab” elites in Khartoum, even as the country’s major resources lay in non-Arab peripheries—oil largely in what is now South Sudan, gold heavily in Darfur. The state, dominated by northern elites, sidelined Darfur and other provinces, while successive regimes in Khartoum—and allied currents in Libya—circulated Arab-supremacist and Islamist narratives that naturalized center–periphery inequality.

    These ideas fed a national identity crisis after British colonialism: who belongs, on what terms, and which regions count as the country’s core. Peace processes—from the Darfur accords to the Juba Agreement—could not undo decades in which violence, marginalization, racialization, and centralizing rule decided who had access to land, protection, and revenue; many in Darfur felt excluded. As violence escalated, identities hardened, turning once-fluid lines between “Arab” and “African” into rigid identities.

    Within this landscape, Hemeti and the RSF sought an ideological pivot. They recast themselves not as a militia born of repression but as spokesmen for neglected peripheries. In public statements—“a Sudan that belongs to all Sudanese… from Darfur to Kassala”—Hemeti styled himself a “son of the people,” rooted in the experiences of Darfur, Kordofan, and the East. The message targeted two audiences at once: peripheral communities long dismissed by the center, and external patrons looking for a post-Bashir interlocutor.

    In an apparent attempt to echo the Sudanese revolution, the RSF brands itself as its continuation—a pro-democracy, anti-Khartoum-elite force promising to redirect wealth from the center to Darfur’s marginalized. Yet the branding is contradictory: in practice, Hemeti moves to replace Khartoum’s elites with his own clan, offering no program for governance—only extraction and short-term gain.

    However, reports suggest that even Hemeti struggles to control the RSF’s Arab militia core. He now resembles Bashir decades earlier: maintaining a fragile coalition of militias with divergent aims that often clash with his own ambitions for a political career. Distinguishing opportunists from true believers is difficult. RSF operations have been largely extractive and looting-driven, with fighters stripping areas of resources and moving the spoils to Darfur or local markets—producing an ebb and flow of fighters at the front as profit opportunities shift.

    References

    1. THE REPUBLIC OF KADAMOL: A Portrait of the Rapid Support Forces at War
    2. The Rapid Support Forces and Sudan’s War of Visions

    Agency and Violence

    TOPSHOT – Makeshift shelters erected by displaced Sudanese who fled El-Fasher after the city fell to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), make up the Um Yanqur camp, located on the southwestern edge of Tawila, in war-torn Sudan’s western Darfur region on November 3, 2025. (Photo by AFP) (Photo by -/AFP via Getty Images)

    This article traced the material and ideological foundations of the Janjaweed, from which the RSF later emerged. One question remains: agency. The Janjaweed and the RSF have been responsible for grave human rights violations for decades—so why do fighters continue to fight for them?

    Hemeti built a capitalist empire that rivals Khartoum’s elites and used that wealth to finance the RSF. The loop is straightforward: the RSF secures resources; those resources fund Hemeti’s businesses; profits flow back into the RSF. This explains capacity and endurance but not the core question: how was the violence justified? A gun does not fire itself; roughly 100,000 fighters chose to join and remain. Pay and material benefits matter, but do they justify mass atrocities, rape, and the destruction of civilian life? While Hemeti’s family captured the revenues, most fighters saw them only as salaries, protection, and status—not ownership or control.

    As economically profitable as the system created by the RSF is, it creates a political crisis for the RSF. The cost of keeping the RSF together is a sort of infinite expansion—one that is necessary to produce the looted goods and checkpoint taxes that sustain its payment system. This expansion means that the RSF is forever in crisis—always in need of new territory to conquer, and always at risk of its structure falling apart.

    Hemeti presents himself and the RSF as champions of the oppressed against corrupt elites in Khartoum, yet the conduct of the war undercuts that claim. He is open about his business ambitions and his ownership of gold mines. After seizing large parts of Khartoum early in the conflict, the RSF left the city in ruins and did not attempt governance—signalling short-term extraction rather than a plan to rule.

    To address the opening question of agency, there isn’t one sufficient reason. Affiliation brings privileges and protection that make continued association advantageous; what is taken by force must be held by force, so violence becomes self-perpetuating; violence also forges identities; social and command networks bind recruits to units; an ideology of dehumanisation lowers barriers to harm; and external funding and resource access reduce the need for local consent. Even together, these factors remain unsatisfying given the scale of the atrocities.

    These factors may explain how the RSF machinery operates, not why its fighters, commanders, and supporters accept its actions. What could ever make atrocities on this scale understandable?


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  • All Eyes on Sudan

    All Eyes on Sudan

    (Photo credit: @galalgoly)

    El Fasher has fallen. The last resistance gun fell silent on October 28th, 2025. This is not a „civil war“, this is an external war of aggression with multiple foreign actors supporting the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) or the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), with minimal concern for the safety or freedom of the people of Sudan.

    And so, the people must resist.

    The resistance committees of El Fasher have written on October 28th, 2025 on facebook:

    Today we declare the fall of the city. In this moment, the last sound of gunfire faded when the last resisting soldier fired his final bullet at the militia inside the city of El Fasher, then fell a martyr—standing, as he was born standing, a guardian of the land he loved until his last breath.

    The city fell, but its dignity did not. Bodies have vanished, but the spirit still flutters over the walls and streets, guarding what remains of memory. Every stone here testifies that its people did not surrender, and that El Fasher was not defeated but betrayed—and has paused to write a new chapter in its history.

    Glory and everlasting remembrance to the martyrs.
    Glory to those who stood firm to the end.
    And to all who kept the pledge and stayed the course.

    EL FASHER, SUDAN — OCTOBER 26, 2025: SEQ 02 — Vantor close-up satellite imagery reveals dense black smoke rising from a fire in a residential area near El Fasher airport. Please use: Satellite image (c) 2025 Vantor.

    The Committee urges everyone to stand against the injustice and inhumanity perpetrated by the UAE-backed RSF militias, and calls on the international and regional community to intensify efforts toward true peace, lasting stability, and complete justice for Sudan and its people.

    To the steadfast masses of our Sudanese people,

    With hearts wracked by pain and filled with anger, we follow the horrific massacres committed by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia against unarmed civilians in the city of El Fasher. These crimes began with systematic siege and starvation and escalated to the most extreme forms of violence: mass killings, rape, arson, looting, the destruction of places of worship, the targeting of journalists, the killing of children, women, and the wounded, the pursuit and killing of civilians fleeing the fighting, and the complete violation of the city.

    This is an extension of a long path of terror and brutality that this militia has practiced against our people across Sudan. What is happening in El Fasher is a fully fledged crime of ethnic cleansing aimed at erasing human existence in Darfur. It makes clear to the world that this militia represents nothing but a project of organized killing and looting, bearing no relation to patriotism or to humanity.

    Accordingly, and out of our revolutionary and humanitarian responsibility, we declare the following:

    1. Our total condemnation of the massacres in El Fasher and of all crimes committed by the Janjaweed militia against civilians.
    2. We hold the leadership of this militia fully criminally responsible for these crimes before the people and before history.
    3. We explicitly call on the international community, the United Nations, the African Union, and free human-rights organizations to designate the Janjaweed militia as a terrorist organization that commits war crimes and crimes against humanity.
    4. We demand the immediate imposition of the harshest, most deterrent sanctions on its military and political leaders, and their prosecution before international courts.
    5. We call for urgent humanitarian corridors to protect civilians and deliver aid to those affected in El Fasher and in besieged areas.

    The blood of our people in El Fasher is a trust upon our shoulders. We will remain faithful to our martyrs until justice is achieved and the killers are held to account.

    Finally, we call on all Sudanese, and all Sudanese components at home and abroad, to elevate the spirit of tolerance, to put the country’s interest above all else, and to build a broad national alignment that seeks to achieve peace in Sudan according to an internal national vision—one that does not reproduce the same problems and strives to sow the seeds of a modern, civil, democratic state.

    We also call on the international and regional community to intensify efforts toward a true peace, lasting stability, and complete justice for Sudan and the Sudanese people.

    We will not forget, we will not forgive, and we will not be silent.
    Glory and eternal honor to the martyrs.
    Freedom, peace, and justice for the entire homeland.

    Signatories:

    1. Coordination of the Resistance Committees – El Fasher
    2. Coordination of Al-Kalaklat and South Khartoum
    3. Coordination of the Resistance Committees – Karari
    4. Neighborhood Committees – Bahri
    5. Gathering of the Committees – Jabal Awliya
    6. Coordination of the Resistance Committees – Old Omdurman
    7. Ghadibun Bila Hudud (“Angry Without Borders”)

    This committee has in a separate post made it clear on which side it stands:

    We do not resemble any group or current that merely seeks to preserve the state and its institutions, nor do we derive our message from anyone else. We represent the voice of the homeland and strive to build a true state free of militias—a state founded on the rule of law, justice, and equal citizenship. Our message is not directed against any social group, sect, or tribe; it is a unifying national stance that rejects injustice in all its forms and stands against anyone who tries to fragment this country or steal its sovereign decision-making. We harbor no hatred toward anyone, but we hold a deep conviction that homelands are not built on narrow loyalties and tribalism, nor safeguarded by unchecked weapons.

    We recognize that the militias imposing their dominance over people today represent nothing but a project of chaos, seeking only to undermine the state and weaken society. Hence our discourse is one of resistance to these forces that want to hijack the homeland and distort its meaning—a resistance through words, awareness, and principle, not through incitement or revenge.

    We are hostile to no one, but we will not compromise on the homeland.

    ANKARA, TURKIYE – NOVEMBER 3: An infographic titled „More than 62,000 people displaced in recent days in El-Fasher“ created in Ankara, Turkiye on November 3, 2025. The UN International Organization for Migration (IOM) reported that more than 62,000 people were displaced within four days after the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) took control of El-Fasher, the capital of North Darfur State in western Sudan, on Oct. 26. (Photo by Mehmet Yaren Bozgun/Anadolu via Getty Images)

    Background

    Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, head of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and effectively the country’s president, is at war with his former deputy, Gen. Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo, who leads the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

    The RSF was created in 2013 from Janjaweed networks and commanders, keeping much of their personnel, tactics, and local power structures.

    The Janjaweed were central to the Darfur war (2003–2020) and were widely accused of genocide and ethnic cleansing against Arab and non-Arab communities. By October 2007, the United States had labeled the Darfur killings genocide, citing an estimated 200,000–400,000 civilian deaths over the prior three years.

    In Darfur, the term “Janjaweed” historically meant bandits or outlaws; victims use the word „Janjaweed“ for camel- and horse-mounted raiders who attacked villages—often alongside government troops with air support.

    The RSF still often gets called „Janjaweed“ by locals indicating that the relabeling of the „Janjaweed“ into RSF was done only in name.

    These „Janjaweed“ militias are often powerful local actors with strong incentives to defend gains in land and livestock—key economic and political assets that bring authority over those who live on and use them.

    After its formation, the RSF was deployed against rebels in Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile, and today stands as the main rival to the SAF.

    (references: Empty Promises, A simple guide to what is happening in Sudan)


    Foreign Complicity

    Several foreign powers—Iran, Russia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—have fueled Sudan’s civil war by supplying drones to opposing sides for over a year. Iran has provided drones to the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), reportedly seeking a Red Sea naval base in return. Russia first leveraged Wagner’s ties to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) to deliver drones and other weapons in early 2023, then switched sides in spring 2024, offering aid to the SAF in exchange for reviving a 2017 deal for a small Russian Red Sea base. Meanwhile, the UAE has backed the RSF to protect its economic and political influence in Sudan and the Red Sea through its relationship with RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo. Both warring parties have used these foreign-supplied drones to gain battlefield advantages and strengthen their hands in ceasefire talks.

    (reference: Drones over Sudan: Foreign Powers in Sudan’s Civil War)

    1. United Arab Emirates

    The UAE has backed the RSF to secure its economic and political influence in Sudan and across the Red Sea, leveraging close ties with RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo. The UN, the United States, and other observers have accused the UAE of funding and supplying the RSF through logistics hubs in neighboring states—Central African Republic, Chad, Libya, and Uganda. In September 2024, The New York Times reported the UAE had begun using Chinese drones comparable to the U.S. MQ-9 Reaper, operating from Chad, to provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support to the RSF.

    Hemedti and the RSF built strong links with Abu Dhabi by joining UAE-aligned military coalitions in Libya and Yemen, ties that have since deepened into an economic partnership. Hemedti’s grip on Sudan’s gold sector—Dubai is the leading importer of Sudanese gold—further cements his value to the UAE. These relationships position him as Abu Dhabi’s preferred partner for a $6 billion port and agriculture project on Sudan’s Red Sea coast announced in 2022, in which Emirati firms hold a 65% profit stake—part of a wider UAE strategy to expand power through client ports along the Red Sea.

    (Reference: Africa File Special Edition: External Meddling for the Red Sea Exacerbates Conflicts in the Horn of Africa)

    2. Egypt

    A March 2022 UN report found that many entitlements in Egypt are not effectively available to all: Sudanese and other East Africans often face discrimination and xenophobia, living in “parallel informal communities” in cities with poor access to education and healthcare. Since April 2023, the war in Sudan has displaced millions—around 25 million people now need aid. Refugees and NGOs report Egyptian security searches in neighborhoods with many Sudanese, with detentions and deportations even for people holding UNHCR cards or pending UNHCR appointments—protection that “used to mean safety” no longer does. At the same time, the EU announced in March 2024 a €7 billion package for Egypt, including at least €200 million for migration control. Critics warn that funding “migration management” while abuses persist risks implicating Brussels and EU states in rights violations.

    Legal and procedural barriers deepen refugees’ vulnerability. Visas are largely unattainable for Sudanese, pushing many to enter irregularly. Asylum seekers must travel over 1,000 km to Cairo to apply, then wait eight to twelve months for UNHCR registration; to stay regular, they are supposed to obtain six-month residence permits, yet by March 2025 the wait for an appointment had reached 29 months, according to civil society groups. Without UNHCR paperwork and residence permits, refugees and asylum seekers live under constant threat of detention.

    (reference: Sudanese Refugees in Egypt: “Voluntary” Returns Amidst Intensified Detention and Deportation Campaign)

    3. Germany and EU

    European—especially German—policy on Sudan has focused on stopping migration and keeping “stability.” Sudan is a main route from Ethiopia and Eritrea, this has meant deals were struck with strongmen instead of addressing the material reasons underpinning migration.

    The result is the opposite of what Europe officially desires: hundreds of thousands are trying to migrate, often „illegally“.

    Even after sanctions against Sudan, the EU (including Germany) kept some security and economic ties with Khartoum, especially on migration and counterterrorism. German involvement went beyond words: reports point to indirect arms transfers through third countries, migration-control projects that strengthened militias, and aid sent through unaccountable state bodies. Despite an arms embargo, German-made weapons (like Heckler & Koch) have been seen in Sudan via intermediaries.

    The RSF was not officially hired, but still gained from EU-backed border programs such as GIZ’s Better Migration Management. EU funding effectively outsourced parts of border control to Sudan’s security forces—including the RSF—by providing surveillance tools and vehicles (Toyota Hilux and Land Cruiser). These were meant for borders but were later used to crush protests, including the June 2019 Khartoum sit-in massacre (at least 186 killed).

    (Reference: From Darfur to Khartoum: How Germany’s migration policies fuelled Sudan’s war machine)


    Documentation

    (https://sudan-genocide.org/index.php)

    A website was founded to be a platform for documenting the RSF militias violations, and to witness what innocents have been up to from killing, displacing and violating. It also contains a comprehensive record of victims, survivors and missing, and a search engine enables families to find their relatives who have arrived in safe and secure areas.


    Demonstration

    Sudanese society has overthrown military regimes three times—1964, 1985, and 2019—through broad, popular mobilization. This history sustains today’s civilian rejection of military rule and offers a basis for political renewal, even amid the destruction in Sudan.

    The setback in El Fasher is only one battle in the Sudanese people’s path to dignity, justice, and freedom. We stand in solidarity with the people of Sudan against all who threaten their dignity and self-determination. Sudan will rise. We honor the people’s resolve.


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